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Abstract— The paper presents a reflection on the role of
technology and, in particular, information technology in the
era of knowledge civilization. Diverse perceptions of this era,
the concepts of three civilization eras versus three waves, of
a cultural platform versus an episteme of a civilization era,
of a big change at the end of industrial civilization era are
outlined. The first principle of cultural anthropology and
the concept of cultural imperialism are recalled. The con-
temporary philosophy of technology is shortly reviewed. An
interpretation of Die Technik und die Kehre of M. Heideg-
ger from a technological point of view is given. It is shown
that we should distinguish technology proper from the sys-
tem of its socio-economic applications, and that the relation
of technology proper to hard science and to socio-economic
applications of technology forms two positive feedback loops;
the one of socio-economic applications might be more dan-
gerous in cases of social infatuation with technological pos-
sibilities or other misapplications of technology. It is shown
that the technology of knowledge civilization era will differ
from that of industrial era in proposing boundless number
of diversified technological possibilities; thus, the Heidegge-
rian warning against social infatuation with technological pos-
sibilities must be not only repeated, but also modified and
strengthened.
Keywords—knowledge civilization era, philosophy of technology,
definition of technology, technology proper versus its system of
social applications, relation between technology, hard sciences,
soft social sciences and humanities.
1. Introduction
As long as ﬁfty years ago, there was no doubt, see, e.g., [1]
that humanity developed because of tool-making, thus
technology is an intrinsic human trait; that many old
civilizations collapsed because their political leaders
(pharaohs, kings, head priests) used the tool-making and
the technological abilities of their people for too ambi-
tious goals; that technology is a way of mastering na-
ture but nature often punishes those human civilizations
which use their technological abilities too ambitiously. All
this simple, basic truth has been, however, questioned dur-
ing last ﬁfty years, while social science and humanities
started to look at technology as an autonomous, dehuman-
izing and enslaving force that in itself leads to an exces-
sive use of its own. Despite these accusations, technology
has brought about the information revolution that includes
also the dematerialization of work: automation, comput-
erization and robotization relieved humans from most of
heavy work and created conditions for an actual realization
of the equality of women. This prepared a new civiliza-
tion era that can be called global knowledge civilization
(or simply knowledge civilization, since it will last many
decades yet before this type of civilization becomes truly
global). This development solves many old problems and
brings many hopes, but also brings new problems and many
dangers.
Thus, it is necessary to reﬂect what will be the future role
of technology in the starting era of knowledge civilization.
Having almost ﬁfty years experience in developing infor-
mation technology and over twenty years in assessing its
future developments and impacts, the author of this pa-
per intended to write an article on such future technology
assessment. However, the basic character of temporary civ-
ilization changes has induced the author to check also the
philosophy of technology; and the state of contemporary
philosophy of technology appeared to him both deeply dis-
turbing and frightening. Disturbing, because the writers in
this ﬁeld seem not to be able even to arrive at a consensus
how to deﬁne consistently what technology is; moreover,
they propose deﬁnitions and interpretations of technology
not acceptable to a technologist. Frightening, because we
need a basic philosophic reﬂection on the future role of
technology in knowledge civilization; but if philosophy is
not even willing to listen to the opinion of technologists
what they truly do, then it will not be able to understand this
apparently distinct human culture. This can have disastrous
results for the entire human civilization on global scale,
because the historical too ambitious uses of technology by
political leaders seem to be based on similar misunder-
standings.
Therefore, we must ﬁrst reﬂect what has happened during
the last ﬁfty years, when three diﬀerent cultural spheres
apparently separated themselves: of social sciences with
humanities, versus hard sciences, versus technologists; how
these cultures view each other; how does this inﬂuence
the philosophy of technology; what is and what is not the
deﬁnition of technology acceptable to its practitioners. First
upon clearing this background we can discuss the future
role of technology in knowledge civilization, its promises
and chances versus its problems and dangers. We must
start, however, with a review of some basic features of the
starting era of knowledge civilization.
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2. The era of knowledge civilization
2.1. Diverse perceptions of a new era
There is a voluminous literature on the subject of informa-
tion society and current information revolution, see [2–9].
In this voluminous literature, there are diverse views, diag-
noses, prognoses, judgments, prescriptions – and a univer-
sally accepted, slowly evolving core. There is an universal
agreement that we are living in times of information revo-
lution and this revolution leads to a new civilization era, in
which knowledge plays even more important role than just
information, thus the new epoch might be called knowl-
edge civilization era. However, many other aspects of this
development are uncertain.
Concerning the date marking the beginning of new era, we
shall follow the method given by historians, in particular
F. Braudel [10]. Braudel deﬁned the preindustrial era of the
beginnings of capitalism, of print and geographic discov-
eries, as starting in 1440 with the improvement of printing
technology by Gutenberg, who promoted broad applications
of printing press, and ending in 1760 with the improvement
of steam engine technology by Watt, who made possible
broad applications of steam machine; this started the next,
industrial civilization era. Similarly, we can take the date
1980, related to the improvements of computer technology
(personal computers) and network technology (broad ap-
plications of new protocols of computer networks), which
made possible broad social use of information technology,
as the beginning date of the era of information and knowl-
edge civilization.
2.2. Three civilization eras versus three waves
In such a way, instead of speaking broadly about three
waves of agricultural, industrial, information civilization
such as discussed in [5], we concentrate more precisely on
three recent (they are not the ﬁrst, nor they will be the last)
civilization eras that are marking the slow globalization of
mankind civilization. These are the eras of:
– preindustrial civilization: print, banking and geo-
graphic discoveries;
– industrial civilization: steam, electricity and mobile
transportation;
– information and knowledge civilization: networks
and mobile communication, knowledge engineering.
For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., [11].
2.3. The cultural platform and the episteme
of a civilization era
It is important to note here, however, that each of these
eras started basing on a deﬁnite cultural platform of new
concepts and ideas formed even before the beginning of
the era, see [6], which after some time was followed by
the formation of an episteme characteristic for the era, see
M. Foucault in [12]. While Foucault rightly stresses that
the way of constructing knowledge in a given era is very
speciﬁc and emerges some time after the beginning of the
era (he dates the emergence of the preindustrial episteme at
least a century after Gutenberg and the emergence of the in-
dustrial episteme at least half a century after Watt), he does
not pay much attention to the origins of an episteme. But
before Gutenberg we had the beginnings of Renaissance,
before Watt we had Newton and French encyclopedists; the
episteme of knowledge civilization is not formed yet, but
the destruction of the industrial episteme and the construc-
tion of a new conceptual platform started with relativism of
Einstein, indeterminism of Heisenberg, with the concept of
feedback and that of deterministic chaos, of order emerging
out of chaos, ﬁnally – with the emergence principle.
The last point deserves an explanation, because its sig-
niﬁcance is not universally perceived yet, particularly in
philosophy. Mathematical modeling of dynamic nonlinear
systems was highly developed already ﬁfty years ago, with
diverse applications but especially in control engineering,
see, e.g., [11] for a more detailed discussion. But such
modeling has lead to the concepts of deterministic chaos
and of order emerging out of chaos, see, e.g., [13].
Thus, the study of mathematical models of nonlinear
dynamic systems resulted in a change of the reduction
paradigm to an emergence paradigm, in a rational justi-
fication of the emergence principle: of new systemic prop-
erties emerging on new levels of complexity, independent
of and irreducible to the properties and parts on lower
levels. Parallel, this emergence principle was justiﬁed em-
pirically by biology in its concept of punctuated evolution,
see, e.g., [14]; but the rational justiﬁcation was important
because it has shown the emptiness of diverse ideologi-
cal attacks on the concept of evolution. This change of
perception was additionally supported by a pragmatic justi-
ﬁcation given by technology, in particular telecommunica-
tions and information science. An example is the ISO/OSI
(International Organization for Standardization/Open Sys-
tems Interconnection) model of seven layers of a computer
network. This model stresses that the functions of such
complex network not only cannot be explained by, but are
also fully independent of the functions of its lowest physi-
cal layer, by the way electronic switching elements work,
repeat and process signals. On each higher layer, new func-
tions and properties of the network emerge. The functions
of the highest application layer, are responsible for applica-
tion software and are absolutely independent from the way
the lowest layer works; they would be the same even if the
switching in the lowest layer would be fully optical or even
quantum mechanics driven.
The ISO/OSI model was used to unify the functions of
various network protocols from TCP/IP (transmission con-
trol protocol/Internet Protocol) family (IP, TCP, UDP, etc.)
that enabled the information revolution and brought dig-
ital information processing potentially to every home on
our globe. The authors of the ISO/OSI model were not
4
Technology and change: the role of information technology in knowledge civilization
necessarily aware of changing the reduction paradigm to
emergence paradigm. They simply wanted to conquer the
complexity of the modern telecommunication networks and
needed to assume the emergence of new properties of the
system on higher layers because otherwise they would be
lost in details. They were probably also unaware of the fact
that the theory of hierarchical systems, including the the-
ory of systems with many layers of qualitatively diﬀerent
functions, irreducible to the functions of lower layers, was
developed some time earlier by control system theorists,
see, e.g., [15].
The industrial episteme believed in reduction principle –
the reduction of the behavior of a complex system to the
behavior of its parts – which is valid only if the level of
complexity of the system is rather low.
With very complex systems today, mathematical model-
ing, technical and information sciences adhere rather to
emergence principle – the emergence of new properties
of a system with increased level of complexity, qualita-
tively different than and irreducible to the properties of
its parts.
It should be noted that the emergence principle is the
essence of complexity (essence in the Heideggerian sense
which will be discussed later) and means much more
than the principle of synergy or holism (that the whole
is more than the sum of its parts) which was noted al-
ready by [16, 17] but without stressing the irreducibility
of holistic properties, see also [11] for a more detailed
discussion.
2.4. What happened at the end of industrial
civilization era
The technology of industrial civilization era was developed
to such a degree that, for the ﬁrst time in the history of hu-
man civilizations, on one hand it promised the possibility
of freeing people from hard work, on the other hand has
shown also the possibility of a total destruction of life on
Earth. Fast and inexpensive travel, mass media and mobile
communication, robotics and automation, landing on the
Moon on one hand were counterbalanced by the specter of
atomic bombs and nuclear death. Additionally, the overam-
bitious uses of technology by political leaders mentioned
in the introduction were aggravated by the fact that entire
societies or social systems have became blinded by their
seemingly unlimited power over nature given to them by
the industrial technology, what has led to the large over-
exploitation of natural resources and severe degradation of
natural environment. This has occurred especially in the
communist system, where the oﬃcial ideology stressed the
social power of transforming the nature; this is occurring
even today in the capitalist system, where the oﬃcial ide-
ology stresses that free market should determine the use
of technology (e.g., in the issue of climate changes) as if
the historical evidence of nature punishing too ambitious
uses of technological abilities counted for nothing. In face
of such controversies, it is no wonder that the ideological
and intellectual crisis at the end of industrial civilization
era has been very deep indeed.
This crisis, by the way, was even deepened by the erosion
and then the fall of communism. The industrial civilization
era had its basic great conﬂict. No matter what our ide-
ological position, it must be objectively admitted that the
big conﬂict of industrial civilization concerned the property
of the fundamental productive resources of this era – the
industrial assets. As soon as the industrial civilization era
ended, the conﬂict became obsolete, which is what ended
the importance of communist ideology. In other words, the
mentioned above trend of dematerialization of work made
obsolete the importance of the proletariat, which took away
communism’s legitimacy. Even if many intellectuals were
disillusioned with communism, most were involved ideo-
logically in this basic great conﬂict and the end of its im-
portance deepened the intellectual crisis.
In epistemology, the beginning of the end of the industrial
era episteme was marked already in 1953 by the seminal
paper of W. V. Quine [18] which has shown that the logi-
cal empiricism is logically inconsistent itself, that all human
knowledge is constructed. However, Quine insisted that this
constructed knowledge should be evolutionary useful and
thus should have limited objectivity, should touch reality at
least by its edges. For diverse reasons, but possibly mostly
because of the controversies and the crisis mentioned above,
social science and humanities went much further to main-
tain that all knowledge is intersubjective – results from
a discourse, is constructed, negotiated, relativist. This gen-
eral belief has many variations. One thesis took the form
of radical biological constructivism – see, e.g., [19, 20]: if
all of knowledge is constructed by the human mind as a re-
sult of biological evolution, then the concept of truth is not
necessary. This radical constructivism was in a sense sup-
ported by radical relativism, starting with radical sociology,
mainly by the strong program of the Edinburgh school, see,
e.g. [21, 22], but also by post-existentialism and postmod-
ernism of, e.g., [12, 23, 24]. Opposite was a further de-
velopment of humanistic rationalism: H.-G. Gadamer [25]
stressed the value of truth as an essence of human self-
realisation. However, humanistic sociology soon took an
anti-rationalist and anti-technological position, initiated by
H. Marcuse [26] with his concept of the single-dimensional
man enslaved by the autonomous, dehumanizing force of
technology; this position was followed essentially by all
social scientists, including, e.g., J. Habermas [27].
In all these disputes, the emergence principle was essen-
tially unnoticed and disregarded, while clearly reductionist
arguments were used to deconstruct the concepts of truth
and objectivity, trying to explain or even to deny the im-
portance of such more complex concepts by the analysis
of more primitive ones, such as money and power. But
seen from the perspective of the emergence principle, truth
and objectivity are concepts of a diﬀerent layer of systemic
complexity; they might be unattainable, but serve very clear
purposes as ideals. Without trying to pursue objectivity,
technology could not be successful, e.g., when trying to
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increase the reliability of transportation vehicles. Thus,
these reductionist deconstruction attempts were in a sense
signs of the end of a civilization era, when a general un-
certainty of values results in a universal, playful anarchy.
The reader might infer that the above judgment is just an
opinion of a technologist – but this already would indi-
cate that a deep cultural rift has emerged between social
sciences and technology towards the end of industrial civ-
ilization era. But we can quote here also the opinion of
H. Kozakiewicz – a known Polish philosopher of sociol-
ogy – who diagnoses [28] a crisis in sociology. She states
that sociology is often called “the most general of so-
cial sciences”. But she asks: in what sense sociology is
a science? It is a science by tradition, since it started
from positivistic beliefs of Comte that society can be de-
scribed using methods similar to hard science. However,
sociology itself revised these beliefs; the formulation that
somebody uses “scientiﬁc methodology” means a strongly
negative epithet for a sociologist today. A branch of so-
ciology, sociology of science, including known trends of
the second half of 20th century – the strong program
of Edinburgh school [21, 22] with its stress of interests,
the micro-constructivism (see, e.g., [29]) with its self-
description of knowledge development, translation sociol-
ogy (see, e.g., [30]) – all deny the possibility of objective
epistemological explanations of science, and treat science
only as a social discourse. What happens if we apply this
approach to sociology itself? A paradox: sociology is a so-
cial discourse about itself.
3. The three separate cultures
of technology, hard science
and social science with humanities
3.1. Why separate cultural spheres?
We have indicated above that the cultural sphere of so-
cial sciences with humanities is diﬀerent from the cultural
sphere of technology, because they adhere to diﬀerent val-
ues, have diﬀerent episteme, use diﬀerent concepts and lan-
guage. But the same obviously concerns also social sci-
ences and humanities versus basic, hard sciences. Less
obvious is the fact that the same distinction concerns hard
sciences versus technology. Some (social science) writers
speak about technoscience; however, it is a great error, one
of many signs of not fully understanding technology – while
science and technology are obviously related, they diﬀer
essentially in their values and episteme. We shall discuss
this diﬀerence later in more detail, but indicate its essence
already here: while science ideals are true theories, tech-
nology ideals relate to the art of solving practical problems,
even if the corresponding theory does not exist yet.
The anthropology of 20th century created a very useful
principle of dealing with separate cultures: you should
never judge a foreign culture without trying to understand
it well – otherwise you are just a cultural imperialist. But
then, what does postmodern sociology of science? By
telling a hard scientist that he does not value truth, only
power and money, it behaves like a communist activist com-
ing to a priest and telling him that he does not value God,
only power and money. By telling a technologist that his
products enslave people, it behaves like telling an artist
that his religious paintings enslave people – essentially, it
behaves like a cultural imperialist. Thus, the episteme of
hard sciences should be discussed, internally criticized and
further developed by hard sciences themselves; the same
concerns technology. The same concerns social sciences
and humanities: until they overcome their own internal cri-
sis, they should not expect that their opinions about hard
science and about technology will be seriously attended to.
3.2. The dominant episteme of a cultural sphere
and its limitations
If we adhered too closely to the principle described above,
these three cultural spheres would become completely sep-
arated, which is neither possible nor desirable. Therefore,
intercultural understanding should be promoted; with this
aim, we present here notes about the dominant episteme of
each culture. In order to foster intercultural understanding,
but also to indicate the limitations of each episteme, we
shall also use metaphors when describing the diﬀerences
between these cultural spheres.
Even if a hard scientist knows that all knowledge is con-
structed and there are no absolute truth and objectivity, he
believes that scientiﬁc theories are laws of nature discov-
ered by humans rather than models of knowledge created by
humans. He values truth and objectivity as ultimate ideals;
metaphorically, hard scientist resembles a priest. However,
a modern hard scientist does not value tradition very much;
he is willing to abandon old theories, if new theories are
closer to the ideals of truth and objectivity.
A technologist is much more relativist in his episteme, he
readily agrees that scientiﬁc theories are models of knowl-
edge – because he uses such theories in solving practical
problems, and if he has several competing theories, he sim-
ply compares their usefulness. If he does not have scientiﬁc
theories to rely upon, he will not agree to wait until such
theories are created1, but will try to solve the problem any-
way using his own creativity. Metaphorically, a technologist
resembles an artist. He also values tradition like an artist
does: an old car is beautiful and, if well cared about, can
become a classic.
A postmodern social scientist or a soft scientist (e.g., histo-
rian2) believes that all knowledge is intersubjective, results
from a social discourse, is constructed, negotiated, rela-
tivist. There are traps in such episteme, it would not stand
up against a serious internal, Kantian-type critique, as in-
dicated by the examples given by Kozakiewicz; but this is
1This corresponds also to personal experiences of the author of this text,
see, e.g., [11].
2Again from personal experience of his family and friends, the author
knows well that not all historians are postmodernist and relativist.
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a sign of an internal crisis that must be overcome by social
and soft sciences themselves. Metaphorically, a postmod-
ern social or soft scientist resembles a journalist: anything
goes as long it is interesting.
3.3. Is a serious philosophy of technology possible
without consulting technologists?
If technology corresponds today to a diﬀerent cultural
sphere, we must give a strongly negative answer to such
a question. This not only results from the principles of
cultural anthropology; it is simply a common sense. It
is just too dangerous not to understand technology, if it
gives us today not only the power to transform totally our
lives, but also to destroy life on Earth – not only by an
inappropriate use of nuclear energy, but also, e.g., by an
inappropriate use of genetic engineering, or even robotic
technology. Postmodern social and soft sciences will not
able to understand technology until they overcome their in-
ternal crisis, achieving a synthesis of intersubjectivity and
objectivity. Hard sciences will continue to see technology
as a mere application of their theories. All this creates an
extremely dangerous situation; the perception of this terri-
fying danger only deepens when we study the contemporary
philosophy of technology.
4. The views of philosophy
of technology
4.1. The general impression of a technologist
The general impression from reading contemporary publi-
cations on philosophy of technology is that they do not un-
derstand technology, even do not actually investigate tech-
nology – they present only slightly modiﬁed views on phi-
losophy of science, treating technology as a mere appli-
cation of science – and often represent anti-technological
attitudes, by propagating the mistaken opinion about tech-
nology as an autonomous, dehumanizing, enslaving force.
For example, an excellent – at least, in its breadth – re-
view of old and current writings on philosophy of technol-
ogy [31] includes 55 papers, of which 14 at the beginning
the volume are on philosophy of science and the ﬁrst of
papers starting the actual discussion on philosophy of tech-
nology [32] is based on the assumption that technology is
just an application of the theories of hard science. The
most basic question of ethics of technology is addressed
by a paper [33] that counterposes technology and ethics:
technology is seen as not only an autonomous and dehu-
manizing force, but also an unethical force. This type of
anti-technological ﬂavor can be seen in most of remaining
papers; of the ﬁnal seven papers, only one [34] is free of
such ﬂavor, but it is immediately followed by a paper crit-
icizing the previous one and presenting technology as the
opiate of intellectuals [35]. And in all 55 papers, there is
no paper written by a technologist.
4.2. A few acceptable views
Nevertheless, few papers present views that are acceptable
to technologists; notably, they are the ones most discussed
or criticized by other papers.
The most close to the perception of a technologist what
he truly does is the fundamental analysis of M. Heideg-
ger in Die Technik und die Kehre [36], repeated in [31]
in somewhat unfortunate translation The Question Con-
cerning Technology; thus, we use somewhat more adequate
translation as a part of the title of this paper. The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology is commented upon in [31]
by a number of other papers, all trying to show either that
Heidegger perceived technology as an autonomous, danger-
ous force or that he was not critical enough of technology;
neither of this papers interprets Heidegger in a way that
a technologist would. The problem of the diﬃculty and di-
versity of interpretations relates to the fact that Heidegger
was a poet at heart, playing with words to achieve empathy
and essential truth as opposed to a correct understanding.
Possibly because of that, he empathically understood the
artistic nature of technology; we comment on this in more
detail later.
There are few other papers in [31] that indicate an under-
standing of the (Heideggerian) essence of technology; an
important one by E. G. Mesthene [34] is devoted to the so-
cial impact of technological change. We quote here some
of his sentences important for further analysis.
At its best, then, technology is nothing if not liberating.
Yet many fear it increasingly as enslaving, degrading,
and destructive of man’s most cherished values. It is
important to note that this is so, and to try to under-
stand why.
Unfortunately, further analysis given by Mesthene is not
conclusive, because he does not make a clear enough dis-
tinction between technology proper and the socio-economic
system exploiting technology, which we shall also discuss
in more detail later.
There are also other writings on philosophy of technology –
curiously, not represented in [31] – that show a (Heidegge-
rian) correct understanding of technology; they are dealing
mostly with the question whether the concept of a Kuh-
nian revolution in science is applicable also to technology3,
see [37], and deﬁne technology as a practical problem-
solving activity, which is certainly correct if still not fully
essential.
4.3. The dangers of mistaken diagnosis
There is, however, a grave danger in the mistaken diagnosis
that technology is an autonomous, enslaving and degrading
force: a wrong diagnosis cannot help to cure the illness.
Technologists perceive the diagnosis as a sign of misun-
derstanding, thus disregard it; social scientists have found
3It is interesting that these writings question the applicability of the
Kuhnian concepts to technology, which is consistent with the perception
of the author of this text that technology is closer to the Popperian concept
of falsification than to the Kuhnian concept of paradigm.
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a scapegoat to put the blame on, thus do not reﬂect on their
own responsibility. But, as we shall show later, both sides
should feel responsible.
We should note that technologists perceive the misunder-
standing by social sciences also in other cases. In sys-
tems research, there is the example of debate between soft
systems thinking and hard systems thinking, in particu-
lar, the issue of soft systems methodology (SSM) [38].
SSM stresses listing diverse perspectives, including so-
called Weltanschauungen, problem owners, and following
open debate representing these diverse perspectives. Actu-
ally, when seen from a diﬀerent perspective, that of hard
mathematical model building, SSM (if limited to its sys-
temic core) must be also evaluated as an excellent ap-
proach, consistent with the lessons derived from the art
of engineering system modeling even much earlier. More
doubts arise when we consider not the systemic core, but
the paradigmatic motivation of SSM. The SSM is presented
by P. Checkland in [38] as a general method, applicable in
interdisciplinary situations; but a sign of misunderstand-
ing is the opinion that soft systems thinking is broader and
includes hard system thinking as deﬁned there. But then,
should not SSM be also applicable to itself? It includes two
Weltanschauungen: hard and soft; thus the problem own-
ers of hard Weltanschauung should have the right to deﬁne
their own perspective. However, hard systems practitioners
never agreed with the deﬁnition of hard systems thinking
given by Checkland. He deﬁnes hard systems thinking as
the belief in the statement of [39] that all problems ulti-
mately reduce to the evaluation of the efficiency of alter-
native means for a designated set of objectives. On the
other hand, hard system technological practitioners say no,
they are hard because they use hard mathematical mod-
elling and computations, but for diverse aims, including
technology creation, when they often do not know what ob-
jectives they will achieve. As a result of such diﬀerences in
episteme, hard and soft systems researchers simply do not
understand each other.
5. What technology is and what it is not
5.1. The definition of technology by Heidegger
as understood by a technologist
M. Heidegger came closest to the essence of technology by
stressing several essential facts:
– technology is obviously means of transforming nature
and also obviously a human activity;
– technology is an art of solving practical problems,
not an application of abstract theory;
– in its essence, the technological act of creation is an
act of revealing the truth out of many possibilities
oﬀered by nature.
We can thus interpret Heidegger that humans cannot es-
cape creating technology, similarly as a child cannot escape
playing with blocks. It is thus our basic, even deﬁning char-
acteristics, an intrinsic human trait.
No matter how we define humanity, we would stop to
be human if we stopped technology creation.
5.2. The warnings of Heidegger as understood
by a technologist
M. Heidegger also perceived that technology in industrial
civilization changed qualitatively when compared to tech-
nology of older times by oﬀering humans almost complete
control over nature. However, such control, when exer-
cised without reﬂection and restraint, might threaten the
very essence of human being. This warning was correct,
we learned later at much cost that our control over nature
is never complete and that unrestrained control over nature
is very dangerous for us.
But Heidegger never condemned technology in itself as
an autonomous, alienating and enslaving force; this con-
demnation came later, started in social sciences by Mar-
cuse [26]. Heidegger writes (about the results of perception
of a complete control over nature) explicitly: Meanwhile . . .
man exalts himself and postures as the lord of the earth.
Thus, though Heidegger did not make a precise distinc-
tion here, his warning concerns not technology proper, but
the social use of technology – and, assuming that Marcuse
has read and understood Heidegger, his condemnation of
technology must be read as shifting the blame.
Nevertheless, a technologist must read a lesson for him-
self out of these controversies: he must be careful what
technologies he puts at social disposal, because the socio-
economic system might use them without restraints and the
blame will be put later not on the system and social scien-
tists apparently responsible for such systems, only on tech-
nology.
5.3. The sovereign though not autonomous position
of technology
We start with a deﬁnition of technology acceptable to tech-
nologists, distinguishing technology proper from the system
of socio-economic applications of technology.
Technology proper is a basic human trait that concen-
trates on the creation of artifacts needed for humanity
in dealing with nature. It presupposes some human
intervention in nature, but can also serve the goal of
limiting such intervention to the necessary scale. It is
essentially a truth revealing, creative activity, thus it is
similar to arts. It is also, for the most part, a prob-
lem solving activity, concentrating on solving practical
problems.
Thus, it uses the results of basic sciences, if they are
available; if they are not, technology proposes its own
solutions, often promoting this way quite new concepts
assimilated later by basic or social sciences. It is not an
autonomous force, because it depends on all other hu-
man activities and influences them in return. It is, how-
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ever, sovereign, in a similar sense as arts are sovereign
human activities. Autonomous forces can be found in
the socio-economic system of applications of technology
proper.
The second part of this deﬁnition requires some discussion
which will be given in the next sections.
5.4. The reverse relation of science and technology
It happens actually very often that technological solutions
precede the developments of science.
The ﬁrst obvious example is the technological development
of a wheel. The mathematical concepts of a circle and that
of actual inﬁnity stem from this technological development:
a wheelwright constructs a wheel as a polygonal structure,
slowly increasing the number of sides of the polygon by cut-
ting consecutive angles, until an approximate circle and an
(approximately) smooth wheel is achieved4. Some philoso-
phers of mathematics [40, 41] show that most of ancient
mathematics before Greek times was technology-oriented
and used not the concept of a formal proof, only that of
pragmatic demonstration.
Another example, well known in the philosophy of sci-
ence [37] is the impact of the technological development
of a telescope on astronomy and Galileo’s ﬁndings.
But there are also modern examples. The improvement of
a steam engine by Watt was a mechanical control engineer-
ing feedback system for stabilizing the rotational speed of
the engine (before Watt, the rotational speed was unsta-
ble and steam engines tended to explode). This not only
started the industrial civilization era, it also motivated sev-
eral lines of scientiﬁc enquiry. One was that of stability of
dynamic systems, started by such great minds as W. Kelvin-
Thomson and J. C. Maxwell, see [42, 43], leading eventu-
ally to diverse aspects of nonlinear systems dynamics and
to the theory of deterministic chaos, thus ﬁnally to the
emergence principle, see [11, 13, 44]. Another was the
extremely important concept of feedback, upon which we
comment later, attributed incorrectly by social scientists –
see, e.g., [45] – to N. Wiener [46]; actually developed
much earlier in telecommunications by H. Nyquist [47],
V. Bush (the creator of the ﬁrst analog computer, earlier
than digital computers) [48], and many others. Equally im-
portant was actually the concept of a system5, attributed
by social science ﬁrst to Comte, then – when Comtian
positivism came under critique – to Wiener and Bertal-
lanfy [16]; but practical systems engineering developed in
technology much earlier, since Watt, and has lead eventu-
ally to the most developed technological systems today –
to computer networks.
4A turning lathe making the wheel really smooth was invented much
later.
5The concept of a system is extremely important too, but possibly not
more important than the concept of feedback; without feedback we would
not have robotics, without robotics we could not transit to knowledge-
based economy where human labor as a basic productive input is substi-
tuted by human knowledge.
Less known is the example of a quasi-random number gen-
erator in digital computers. Developed already in 1950s,
preceding the development of the theory of deterministic
chaos starting in 1960s, the principle of such a generator
exempliﬁes in fact the basic principles of a strange attrac-
tor: take a dynamic system with strong nonlinearity and in-
clude in it a suﬃciently strong negative feedback to bring
it close to instability. In the quasi-random generator, we
use recourse, repetition instead of dynamics and feedback
and add a strong nonlinearity. The simplest example is:
take a digital number, square it, cut a quarter of its highest
bits and a quarter of its lowest bits, and repeat the proce-
dure. The resulting sequence of digital numbers is in fact
periodic, but with a very long period and behaving mean-
while as if it were random. Thus, technological “applica-
tions” of deterministic chaos theory appeared earlier than
the theory.
There are many other such examples in the recent history
of information science and technology. The development
of data warehousing in early 1990s was caused by eco-
nomic and technological necessities, independent from ex-
isting theories; but it in a sense surprised information sci-
ence specialists that concentrated before on relational data
bases, and is leading today to new advancements in infor-
mation science, etc.
5.5. Two positive feedback loops
Thus, how do hard, basic science and technology depend
on each other? As in many questions of human devel-
opment, they inﬂuence each other through the intellec-
tual heritage of humanity, the third world of K. Popper,
see [11, 49]. But this inﬂuence forms a positive feedback
loop, see Fig. 1; technological development stimulates basic
science, scientiﬁc theories are applied technologically.
Fig. 1. Two positive feedback loops.
We must recall that feedback – the circular impact of the
time-stream of results of an action on its time-stream of
causes – was used by Watt in a negative feedback loop.
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Feedback can be of two types: positive feedback when the
results circularly support their causes, which results in a fast
development, like a growing avalanche, and negative feed-
back when the results circularly counteract their causes,
which results in an actually positive eﬀect of stabilization
(for example, the stabilization of human body temperature
is based on negative feedback). The concept of feedback
essentially changed our understanding of the cause and ef-
fect relationship, resolving paradoxes of circular arguments
in logic, though it must be understood that such paradoxes
can be resolved only by dynamic, not static reasoning and
models.
But the positive feedback loop between technology and sci-
ence works relatively slowly: technological stimulations are
analyzed by science with much delay, technology also does
not reply instantly to new scientiﬁc theories.
The second positive feedback loop is between technol-
ogy and the systems of its socio-economic applications.
The distinction between technology proper and its socio-
economic applications is not stressed suﬃciently by social
sciences, in particular by postmodern philosophy of tech-
nology, though it should be obvious for at least two reasons.
The ﬁrst is that technologists often work on a technological
problem quite long (e.g., almost ﬁfty years in the case of
digital television) before their results are broadly socially
applied. The second is simple: technologists do not make
much money, technology brokers do, similarly as art bro-
kers make more money than artists. By technology brokers
we understand here entrepreneurs, managers, bankers, etc.,
all our socio-economic systems turn around applications
of technology. If a technological product or service, such
as mobile telephony, produces much revenue, then more
money is available for its further technological develop-
ment; this leads to truly avalanche-like processes of social
adoption of technological hits.
But these processes have also strange dynamic properties,
socio-economic acceptance of novelties is slow, there is
usually a large delay between purely technological possibil-
ity and the start of an avalanche of its broad socio-economic
applications (not only in the case of digital television; this
delay time amounted also to almost 50 years in the case
of cellular telephony). This delay has many causes; one
is the necessity to develop such technological versions that
are inexpensive enough for an average customer; another
is an initial social distrust turning into a blind social fasci-
nation once a technological hit becomes fashionable. For
this reason, once it starts to work, the second positive feed-
back loop is much stronger and faster than the ﬁrst one.
This blind social fascination is actually the autonomous
force incorrectly attributed by social philosophy to technol-
ogy proper, it is precisely the source of the Heideggerian
danger that man exalts himself and postures as the lord
of the earth. For example: how many people are aware
that mobile telephony makes it very diﬃcult to practice
radio-astronomy from Earth surface, that it is the reason
of moving radio-telescopes into cosmic space? And this
is a relatively modest adverse eﬀect; what if an avalanche-
like adoption of a technological hit would result in truly
disastrous eﬀects? After all, a nuclear power station is
also based on avalanche-like processes that must be care-
fully controlled – by negative feedback systems of control
engineering – to be safe; but if such systems fail (or are
tampered with for fun by irresponsible people, like in the
Chernobyl case), the disaster can have no limits.
The answer to the question of Mesthene: why it is so
that many people perceive technology as an alienating
force, enslaving, degrading, and destructive of man’s
most cherished values, might be the following: the es-
sential reason of it is the intuitive perception of such
danger of a social infatuation with technology leading
to avalanche-like process of social adoption of techno-
logical hits with diverse resulting threats and possible
catastrophic results.
Being intuitive, the perception needs not to be rationally
correct and the diagnosis can be wrong, see the discussion
of a rational theory of intuition in [11]; in order to obtain
correct answers and useful diagnosis, we must analyze it
critically. Thus, we encounter crucial questions here:
1. What mechanisms limit and stabilize the avalanche-
like processes of socio-economic adoption of techno-
logical hits?
2. Who is responsible for overseeing that these mecha-
nisms work eﬀectively?
The one mechanism that at least safely prevents any eco-
nomic excesses is the market economy; people tried to
replace market by human intervention in the communist
system without success. However, it is only a robust mech-
anism, it does not solve many problems and creates some
new ones. For example, because knowledge-based econ-
omy sharply decreases marginal production costs, prices
on high technology markets have today no relation to (ac-
tually, are over hundred times higher than) marginal pro-
duction costs; therefore, an ideal, free market simply does
not work in knowledge-based economy, and a monopolistic
or oligopolistic behavior is typical, see, e.g., [50]. Who
will watch over such global oligopolistic markets?
As to the responsibility, obviously it should be borne ﬁrst
by the technology brokers. However, to be eﬀective on the
market, they must be motivated by proﬁt, let us only hope
that the motivation will be tempered by ethics. Ethics re-
sults from education; who educates technology brokers?
Not technologists proper, but social and soft scientists.
They should not only educate well technology brokers eth-
ically, but also help them to understand their future jobs by
analyzing in detail the mechanisms of social demand for
technology, of infatuation with technological hits, together
with their dangers.
Thus, the ultimate responsibility for socio-economic ap-
plications of technology, for overseeing the effective limi-
tations of blind social fascination with technological hits
lies at soft and social sciences.
Unfortunately, they do not perform well in this respect, pre-
fer to put the blame on technology proper, undistinguished
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from the system of its socio-economic applications and de-
plored by them as a technocratic tool of enslavement by
promoting the functionalist view of the world. This is in-
dicated by the question marks in Fig. 1: while the role of
hard, basic sciences and technology proper versus its socio-
economic applications is clear, soft and social sciences do
not seem to fullﬁl nor even understand their role.
This does not mean that technology proper is not co-
responsible and should not at least try to work together
with social scientists on limiting such dangers. However,
a technologist is usually very conscious of ethical dangers,
carefully considers possible future impacts of technology
developed by him – and even if it is not the case, he must
be careful because he knows that the blame for any pos-
sible misfortunes and misapplications will be put on him.
On the other hand, we cannot expect that the responsi-
bility of technologists will prevent all misapplications of
technology. One reason is that human creativity of mis-
applications is boundless (against stupidity, the gods them-
selves contend in vain). Another is more serious: the very
nature of knowledge-based economy will give human soci-
eties almost boundless possibilities to choose from diverse
technological options.
6. What will be the technology
of the knowledge era
(postmodern technology?)
6.1. The character of technology in the knowledge era
We must ask today a renewed version of Heidegger’s ques-
tion about die Kehre (the change of the character of tech-
nology, in his case in the industrial era as compared to
earlier times). The question is: in what qualitative aspect
will the technology of knowledge civilization era differ from
the technology of industrial civilization era? A tentative
answer proposed as the main conclusion of the paper is:
The technology of knowledge civilization era will differ
in complexity, by proposing an unlimited number of di-
versified technological possibilities, oriented toward not
only products, but also services, including such services
as creativity support, and only a small part of these
possibilities will be actually accepted for economic and
social use.
We could call it postmodern technology, but the change will
be deeper than the intellectual fad of postmodernism indi-
cating the end of industrial civilization. We shall illustrate
this answer by some examples.
6.2. Some examples of technology of the knowledge era
One of the most important possibilities brought by the tech-
nology of the knowledge era will be the change of the char-
acter of recording of the intellectual heritage of humanity.
In the last two civilization eras – the preindustrial and the
industrial – the dominant medium of recording the human
heritage were printed books. Information technology will
make soon possible full multimedia recording of human
heritage; in other words, instead of a book we will have
an electronic record including ﬁlm, music, interactive exer-
cises and virtual laboratories. Imagine today the possibility
of listening to a lecture of Kant or Einstein recorded in such
a way; but the change goes beyond such possibilities. This
change will have impacts exceeding the impacts of Guten-
berg printing technology; the nature of our civilization will
change, multimedia recording will stronger support the in-
tergenerational transmission of intuitive knowledge and of
humanity intuitive heritage, will enable more eﬀective dis-
tant and electronic education, see [11] for more detailed
discussions.
Another possibility concerns ambient intelligence, called
also AmI in Europe, either ubiquitous (omnipresent) com-
puting or wireless sensor network in the United States, in-
telligent home or building or yaoyorozu6 in Japan. There is
no doubt that the number of possible ways of helping peo-
ple by using computer intelligence dispersed in sensors and
processors in our ambient habitat – at homes, in oﬃces, in
shops, in vehicles, etc. – is endless and that people will
buy such technology once it is truly ubiquitous and inex-
pensive. However, there are also grave social threats related
to this technology – not immanent in the technology, but in
the way people might use it. Ambient intelligence requires
electronic identiﬁcation of a person, say, when entering his
room. What would prevent overzealous police from using
this technology as a way of realizing the concept of a Big
Brother? Ambient intelligence means also ubiquitous robo-
tization; what would constrain too inventive criminals from
using robotic squads to break into banks or as invincible
bodyguards?
We will mention here only one more of the endless possi-
bilities of future technology of the knowledge civilization
era. Computerized decision support, developed towards the
end of industrial civilization, can be developed further into
computerized creativity support, helping in the creation of
knowledge and technology. For this purpose, we must un-
derstand better knowledge creation processes – not on grand
historical scale, such as in the theories of T. Kuhn [51]
and many philosophers following his example, but on a mi-
cro scale, for today and tomorrow. There are many such
micro-theories of knowledge creation emerging in the last
decade of the 20th century and in the ﬁrst decade of
the 21st; the book Creative Space [11] was motivated pre-
cisely by the need of integrating such theories.
6.3. New warnings: what we must be careful about
In all these possibilities, complexity and diversity, there is
also a general danger and we must thus also repeat a re-
newed version of Heidegger’s warning. As already per-
ceived by Heidegger, the danger lies not in technology
proper, but in us, humans fascinated by the possibilities
6Eight million Shinto gods, implying omnipresence.
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of technology and not fully understanding the threats of
such fascination.
In particular, the seemingly unbounded technological pos-
sibilities might suggest to people – particularly to technol-
ogy brokers – that human intellectual heritage is rich and
boundless enough to privatize it without restraint. Already
today we observe many attempts of knowledge privatiza-
tion. However, similarly as the unbounded privatization of
natural resources in the industrial civilization era has led to
grave pollution of natural environment, unbounded privati-
zation of intellectual heritage will lead to pollution of this
heritage – what we already observe, e.g., on drug markets.
Thus, the modiﬁed Heideggerian warning is:
In the industrial civilization era, people became blinded
by their seemingly unlimited power over nature given to
them by the industrial technology, what has led to the
large overexploitation of natural resources and frequent
degradation of natural environment. We must take care
in the knowledge civilization era not to become blinded
by the seemingly unlimited possibilities of products and
services offered by technology, in particular – we must
take care to preserve our intellectual environment, the
intellectual heritage of humanity.
7. Conclusions
There is no doubt that technology contributed essentially
to the change of civilization eras, from the industrial to
information and knowledge civilization observed now. The
change has a social character, but resulted from technology,
from computer networks making possible the wide social
use of information technology. Technology brought also
the dematerialization of work: automation, computerization
and robotization have relieved humans from most of heavy
work and created realistic conditions for the equality of
women.
This was desired by many social thinkers, but, ironically,
they usually – starting with [26] – condemned technol-
ogy as an autonomous, alienating, de-humanizing force,
as a technocratic tool of enslavement or functionalist view
of the world. Similarly, technological objectivism was con-
demned as an outdated form of positivistic thinking; this
paradigmatic attitude was strongest in postmodernist and
constructivist approaches, but it has been paradigmatically
upheld by sociology in general. This condemnation is still
the prevailing reason for the lack of understanding of tech-
nology by sociology.
Technology, on the other hand, is motivated by the joy of
creation (as observed by Heidegger, the old Greek word
techne meant creative arts and crafts). To be successful
in such creation, technology requires informed objectivity.
Technologists understand that there is no absolute knowl-
edge and truth, nor absolute measurement precision – but
they must try to be as objective as possible, must not over-
look inconvenient or unpopular information, since such ne-
glect can result in a technical failure of systems they con-
struct.
Technological informed objectivism is not the positivistic
belief that ultimate truth exists based on empirical facts,
since many technologists admit that we create knowledge
and cannot attain absolute truth, but it is the conviction that
objectivity and closeness to empirical facts are useful goals
that have always helped in the successful construction of
technological artifacts, even if these goals are ultimately
unattainable. Social science seems not to be able to under-
stand this distinct culture of technologists and condemns
it without understanding, which is equivalent to cultural
imperialism.
Even more pronounced is the misunderstanding of tech-
nology in postmodern social philosophy. Philosophy could
not come to a synthesis of opinions about the role of tech-
nology, even if a very deep analysis of the essence of
technology was given by Heidegger. However, we need
an acceptable deﬁnition of technology at the beginning of
knowledge civilization era and should agree that such def-
inition of technology for a general reflection must come
from problem owners, i.e., technologists, in particular from
technologically oriented systems science.
Such a deﬁnition is proposed in this paper; it stresses that
technology is a basic human trait that concentrates on the
creation of artifacts needed for humanity in dealing with na-
ture. We cannot stop being technologically creative without
stopping being human. Technology presupposes some hu-
man intervention in nature, but can also serve the goal of
limiting such intervention to the necessary scale. As sug-
gested by Heidegger, technology is, in its essence, a truth
revealing, creative activity, thus it is similar to arts. It is
also, for the most part, a problem solving activity, concen-
trating on solving practical problems – although recently,
like basic science, it is involved also in searching for new
perspectives.
The relation of technology and basic science forms a pos-
itive feedback loop: technology poses new problems and
concepts for basic science, basic science produces results
that might be later applied in technology – but technology
is sovereign in this loop, proceeds to ﬁnd solutions even
without having the input of basic sciences. In this sense,
the technological development of the wheel motivated the
development of mathematics together with the concept of
actual inﬁnity, which in turn helped in further development
of technology. There are many other examples of such
reverse relationship between hard science and technology.
Even more important is the second positive feedback
loop between technology proper and the system of its
socio-economic applications. These applications are man-
aged by technology brokers, i.e., entrepreneurs, managers,
bankers, etc., all our socio-economic systems turn around
applications of technology. This second feedback loop
brings about most social and economic results of technol-
ogy, but at the same time it may create grave dangers. This
is because processes of socio-economic adoption of tech-
nological novelties in this feedback loop are avalanche-like;
such processes are known, e.g., in nuclear reactors, where
they must be controlled and stabilized by additional neg-
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ative feedbacks. If this additional stabilization does not
work properly, disasters might occur. An intuitive percep-
tion of the threat of such disasters is the essential reason for
condemnation of technology by social sciences and human-
ities. But this intuitive perception does not give a correct
diagnosis.
In socio-economic adoption of technology, the stabilization
of avalanche-like processes is achieved by market mecha-
nism, but this mechanism on high technology markets does
not function ideally, has a tendency to promote oligopolies
and monopolies. Moreover, market obviously does not re-
solve ethical issues of technology adoption. Since technol-
ogy brokers are educated mostly by soft and social sciences,
the ultimate responsibility for socio-economic applications
of technology, for overseeing the eﬀective limitations of
blind social fascination with technology lies also at soft
and social sciences.
We are repeating in this paper, in a sense and in new con-
ditions, the analysis presented by Heidegger in Die Technik
und die Kehre, coming to the main conclusion that the tech-
nology of knowledge civilization era will diﬀer from that
of industrial era in complexity, by proposing an unlimited
number of diversiﬁed technological possibilities, oriented
toward not only products, but also services, including such
services as creativity support.
We also are repeating and strengthening the Heideggerian
warning about human fascination with technological pos-
sibilities: we must take care in the knowledge civilization
era not to become blinded by the seemingly unlimited pos-
sibilities of products and services offered by technology, in
particular – we must take care to preserve our intellectual
environment, the intellectual heritage of humanity.
References
[1] P. Ritchie Calder, The Inheritors. The Story of Man and the World
he Made. London: The Reprint Society, 1962.
[2] M. McLuhan, Understanding Media. London: Ark Paperbacks,
1964.
[3] D. Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Fore-
casting. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
[4] J. Masuda, The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society.
Tokyo: Institute for the Information Society, 1980 (Amer. ed. Wash-
ington: World Future Society, 1981).
[5] A. Toﬄer, The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow, 1980.
[6] A. P. Wierzbicki, “Education for a new cultural era of informed
reason”, in Windows of Creativity and Inventions, J. G. Richardson,
Ed. Mt. Airy: Lomond, 1988.
[7] P. F. Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society. Oxford: Butterworth Heine-
mann, 1993.
[8] M. Castells, End of Millenium: The Information Age. Vol. 1–3. Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2000.
[9] A. Mattelart, Histoire de la société de l’information. Paris: Editions
La Découverte, 2001.
[10] F. Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme,
XV–XVIII siecle. Paris: Armand Colin, 1979.
[11] A. P. Wierzbicki and Y. Nakamori, Creative Space: Models of
Creative Processes for Knowledge Civilization Age. Heidelberg:
Springer, 2005 (in print).
[12] M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sci-
ences. New York: Routledge, 1972.
[13] J. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Viking Pen-
guin, 1987.
[14] K. Lorentz, “Evolution and modiﬁcation of behavior: a critical ex-
amination of the concepts of the “learned” and the “innate” elements
of behavior”. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
[15] W. Findeisen, F. N. Bailey, M. Brdyś, K. Malinowski, P. Tatjewski,
and A. Woźniak, Control and Coordination in Hierarchical Systems.
Chichester: Wiley, 1980.
[16] L. Bertallanfy, General Systems Theory. General Systems. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1956.
[17] R. I. Ackoﬀ, “Towards a behavioural theory of communication”, in
Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist, W. Buckey,
Ed. Chicago: Aldine, 1957.
[18] W. V. Quine, (1953), “Two dogmas of empiricism”, in Philosophy of
Mathematics, P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, Eds. Englewood Cliﬀs:
Prentice-Hall, 1964.
[19] H. Maturana, “Biology of cognition”, in Autopoiesis and Cognition,
H. Maturana and F. Varela, Eds. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980.
[20] H. von Foester, “On constructing a reality”, in Environmental Sys-
tems Research, E. Preiser, Ed. Stroudberg: Dowden, Hutchingson
& Ross, 1973.
[21] B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London:
Routledge & Kegan, 1974.
[22] D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge
& Kegan, 1976.
[23] J. Derrida, Of Grammatology. Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1974.
[24] J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
[25] H.-G. Gadamer, Warheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philo-
sophishen Hermeneutik. Tübingen: J.B.C. Mohr (Siebeck), 1960.
[26] H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
[27] J. Habermas, Lectures on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
[28] H. Kozakiewicz, “Epistemologia tradycyjna a problemy współ-
czesności. Punkt widzenia socjologa”, in Pogranicza epistemo-
logii, J. Niżnik, Ed. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 1992
(in Polish).
[29] K. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge. An Essay on the
Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1981.
[30] B. Latour, “Science in action”, in Postmodern? No, Simply A-Mod-
ern! Steps Towards an Anthropology of Science. Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, 1990.
[31] Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, R. C.
Scharﬀ and V. Drusek, Eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
[32] M. Bunge, (1979), “Philosophical inputs and outputs of technol-
ogy”, in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition,
R. C. Scharﬀ and V. Drusek, Eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2003.
[33] K. Schrader-Frechette, (1992), “Technology and ethics”, in Philoso-
phy of Technology: The Technological Condition, R. C. Scharﬀ and
V. Drusek, Eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
[34] E. G. Mesthene, (1967), “The social impact of technological
change”, in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition,
R. C. Scharﬀ and V. Drusek, Eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2003.
[35] J. McDermont, (1969), “Technology: the opiate for intellectu-
als”, in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition,
R. C. Scharﬀ and V. Drusek, Eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2003.
[36] M. Heidegger, “Die Technik und die Kehre”, in M. Heidegger,
Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954.
[37] The Nature of Technological Knowledge. Are Models of Scientific
Change Relevant? R. Laudan, Ed. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984.
[38] P. B. Checkland, “From optimizing to learning: a development




[39] R. I. Ackoﬀ, “The future of operational research is past”, J. Oper.
Res. Soc., vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 93–104, 1974.
[40] J. Bronkhorst, “Panini and Euclid: reﬂections on Indian geometry”,
J. Indian Phil., vol. 29, pp. 43–80, 2001.
[41] Z. Król, Platon i podstawy matematyki współczesnej. Nowa Wieś:
Wydawnictwo Rolewski, 2005 (in Polish).
[42] W. Thomson and P. G. Tait, A Treatise on Natural Philosophy. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1867.
[43] J. C. Maxwell, “On governors”, Proc. Royal Soc. London, vol. 16,
pp. 270–283, 1868.
[44] M. Lucertini, A. M. Gasca, and F. Nicolo, “Technological concepts
and mathematical models in the evolution of modern engineering
systems”. Basel: Birkhauser, 2004.
[45] M. C. Jackson, Systems Approaches to Management. New York:
Kluwer, 2000.
[46] N. Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Ani-
mal and the Machine. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948.
[47] H. Nyquist, “Regeneration theory”, Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 11,
pp. 126–147, 1932.
[48] V. Bush, “The diﬀerential analyzer. A new machine for solving dif-
ferential equations”, J. Franklin Instit., vol. 212, pp. 447–488, 1931.
[49] K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972.
[50] W. B. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the
Economy. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1994.
[51] T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1962.
Andrzej Piotr Wierzbicki
born June 29, 1937 in Warsaw.
Graduated in 1960 as Master
of Engineering at the Faculty
of Telecommunications, War-
saw University of Technology
(WUT). He took a Ph.D. degree
at this University in 1964, for
a thesis on nonlinear feedback
systems; D.Sc. degree in 1968,
for a thesis on optimization
of dynamic systems. In 1971–75 Deputy Director of the
Institute of Automatic Control, later Deputy Dean of the
Faculty of Electronics, Warsaw University of Technology.
In 1975–78 the Dean of the Faculty of Electronics,
WUT. Since 1978 worked with the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg n. Vienna,
Austria; 1979–84 as the chairman of the theoretical branch,
Systems and Decision Sciences Program, of this Institute.
From 1985 back in the Institute of Automatic Control,
WUT, as a Professor of optimization and decision theory.
In 1986–91 scientiﬁc secretary of the Committee of Future
Studies “Poland 2000” (in 1990 renamed “Poland 2000+”)
of P.Ac.Sc.; currently deputy chairman. In 1991 elected
a member of the State Committee for Scientiﬁc Research
of Republic of Poland and the chairman of its Commission
of Applied Research. Deputy chairman of the Council
of Polish Foundation for Science (1991–94). Chairman
of scientiﬁc councils of NASK (National Scientiﬁc and
Academic Computer Network) in Poland (1994–2004)
and PIAP (the Industrial Institute of Measurements and
Control) (1992–2004). Editor in chief of the quarterly
“Archives of Control Sciences” of P.Ac.Sc. (1986–96).
Since 1997 deputy chairman of the Committee for Coop-
eration with IIASA of P.Ac.Sc. In 1996–2004 the Director
of the National Institute of Telecommunications in Poland.
In 2000–2003 a member of ISTAG (Information Society
Technology Advisory Group) of European Commission.
In 2001–2004 the chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Scientiﬁc International Relations of the State Committee
for Scientiﬁc Research of Poland. From 2004 a Research
Professor at National Institute of Telecommunications in
Poland and at Japan Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology, Nomi, Ishikawa, Japan. Beside teaching and
lecturing for over 45 years and promoting over 80 master’s
theses and 18 doctoral dissertations at WUT, he also
lectured at the Faculty of Mathematics of Warsaw Uni-
versity and at doctoral studies: at WUT; at the Academy
of Mining and Metallurgy in Cracow; at the University
of Minnesota; at the Technische Hochschule Ilmenau; at
Fernuniversität Hagen; at Kyoto University. Author of
over 180 publications, including 12 books (5 monographs,
7 – editorship of joint international publications), over
60 articles in scientiﬁc journals, over 90 papers at confer-
ences; author of 3 patents granted and industrially applied.
Current interests include parallelization of optimization
algorithms using vector optimization and multiple criteria
approaches, diverse aspects of negotiation and decision
support, including, e.g., applications of fuzzy set theory
for describing uncertainty in decision support models,
multimedia software in computer networks and in distance
education, diverse issues of information society and
civilization, rational theories of intuition and of knowledge
creation. Languages: English, German, Russian – each
ﬂuent, beside native Polish. Member of IEEE, ISMCDM
(International Society of Multiple Criteria Decision Mak-
ing), SEP (Polish Society of Electrical Engineers), PTM
(Polish Mathematical Society), PSKR (Polish Association
for the Club of Rome). In 1992 received (as ﬁrst European
researcher) the Georg Cantor Award of the International
Society of Multiple Criteria Decision Making for his con-
tributions to the theory of vector optimization and multiple
criteria decision support. In 2004 received Belgian Royal
Distinction Le Merite de l’Invention, d’Oﬃcier Croix.
In 2004 received Tomasz Hofmokl Prize of NASK of
Poland for promoting the idea of informational society.
In 2005 received Best Paper Award at the 38th Hawaii
International Conference of System Science, for the paper
“Knowledge creation and integration: creative space and
creative environments” (with Y. Nakamori).
e-mail: andrzej@jaist.ac.jp





National Institute of Telecommunications
Szachowa st 1
04-894 Warsaw, Poland
14
